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LIST OF PARTIES 
At the time of preparation of this brief the parties to 
this action are the same as those listed in the caption, except 
that Kenneth A. Okasaki has been voluntarily dismissed from the 
action • This appeal only directly involves the Plaintiffs arid 
the Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffrnan who vfas dismissed from the 
action over the Plaintiffs1 objection. 
The Defendants Aldine J, Coffrnan, Jr. and Coffrnan, 
Coffrnan and Woods, a professional corporation, who are not 
parties to this appeal, are represented by Tim Dalton Dunn and 
Anne Swensen who also represent the Defendant-Respondent Penelope 
Dalton Coffrnan in this appeal. 
The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber, who is not a party to 
this appeal, is represented by ^ Thomas L. Kay, P.O. Box 45385, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 04145-0305, (001) 532-1500. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS INCORPORATED UNDER THE UTAH 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT ARE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE 
FOR THE ACTIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION 
EVEN ABSENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REPRESENTATION 
OF A CLIENT 
CONCLUSION ! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED Page 
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 SE2d 
674, (1983) 2,3 
In Re Disciplinary Action of McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701, 
(1986) 2 
STATUTES CITED 
Professional Corporation Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Title 16-11-1 2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII 2 
iv 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SjTATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE 
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PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and Woods, a 
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known as COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
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Category No. 13.b. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEf 
ARGUMENT 
MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS INCORPORATED UNDER THE UTAH 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT ARE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
THE ACTIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION 
EVEN ABSENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REPRESENTATION 
OF A CLIENT 
The Respondent's and Amicus Curiae's (Utah State Bar 
Association's) arguments rest on the assumption that the practice 
of law is just another business which is subject to regulation by 
the legislature. Such assumption is invalid. Even if, arguendo, 
the legislature's clear statement in Section 16-11-10 of the 
Professional Corporation Act is turned on its head to wrongly 
divine an intention by the legislature to alter the professional 
relationship between clients and law firms, such an 
interpretation assumes an unconstitutional exercise of power by 
the legislature. The power of regulating the professional 
conduct of attorneys rests with the Supreme Court, not the 
legislature. In Re Disciplinary Action of McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 
701, 704-5 (1986); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoriaf 250 Ga 844, 
302 SE2d 674 (1983). Article VIII, Section 1 of the pre-1985 
Utah Constitution conferred and the current Article VIII, Section 
4 of the Constitution confers the power of regulating the 
practice of law on the Supreme Court. In Re Disciplinary Action 
of McCune, supra, p.704. The legislature has no power to alter 
the professional relationship between clients and law firms who 
represent them and the professional Corporation Act should not be 
interpreted to find such an abuse of power by the legislature 
unless the Court is willing to also declare the act 
unconstitutional. 
In Zagoria, supra, the Georgia Supreme Court stated: 
We do not view this case as one in which we need to 
interpret the statute providing for the creation and 
operation of professional corporations. We rather view 
this case as one which calls for the exercise of this 
court's authority to regulate the practice of law. 
This court has the authority and in fact the duty to 
2 
regulate the law practice and in the past two decades 
we have been diligent in our exercise of this duty.... 
The diligence of this court has been directed toward 
the assurance that the law practice will be a 
professional service and not simply a commercial 
enterprise. The primary distinction is that a 
profession is a calling which demands adherence to the 
public interest as the foremost obligation of the 
practitioner. The professional corporation statute 
should be interpreted with this thought in mind. The 
legislature has the clear right to enact technical 
rules for the creation and operation of professional 
corporation, but it cannot constitutionally cross the 
gulf separating the branches of government by imposing 
regulations upon the practice of law. 
Zagoria, supra, p. 553. 
Once the high ethical duties inherent1in the practice of law 
are brought into consideration the appropriate decision in this 
case becomes clear. The legislature has no power to ignore, and 
the Supreme Court is charged with the high duty to assure, the 
highest integrity of the practice of law. The practice of law 
cannot tolerate a double standard of liability between attorneys 
who practice law by traditional partnership and those who choose 
to operate their partnerships as "professional corporations". 
Zagoria, supra, p. 555. 
As stated by the Court in Zagoria, 
When a client engages the services of a lawyer the 
client has the right to expect the fidelity of other 
members of the firm. It is inappropriate for the 
lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the shadows 
and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the 
responsibilities of professionalism. 
Zagoria , supra , p. 554. 
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While the brief of Amicus Curiae alleges that under its 
proposed holding the professional corporation would be at hand to 
answer for the malpractice of a shareholder, such a "surety" 
would prove vaporous after the "hide-and-seek" methods available 
to professional corporations to avoid liability have been 
employed. One can readily foresee "professional corporations" 
wherein profit sharing occurs but each "shareholder" privately 
owns a different reporting system, his own computer, copier and 
other equipment and the corporation itself owns no physical 
assets subject to levy. Lawyers will enjoy the benefit of shared 
profits without the risk of losses and rightly retain the public 
image of a privileged class. 
The suggestion of the availability of malpractice insurance 
to protect clients is no more than an invalid assumption that 
lawyers, whether they play hide-and-seek with their assets or 
not, will always be able to afford to purchase and will always 
purchase a policy which will fully cover every mishap. The 
Amicus Curiae is most capable of briefing this court on the 
current and real problems regarding insurance affordibility and 
availability. 
Simply put, shareholders in professional corporations are 
not the same as shareholders in business corporations. Lawyers 
in professional corporations are professionals who intimately 
4 
work with each other and, even if not actively assigned to a 
case, are available to share work product and offer advice on a 
point of law when asked. Under the result proposed by Respondent 
and Amicus Curiae, one can foresee shareholders who are, in fact, 
participating in a case, not listing themselves as co-counsel and 
lurking in the shadows so as to not be detected by a potentially 
aggrieved client. The public thus becomes the victim of a game 
of hide-and-seek enjoyed by a class wnich, while ostensibly 
burdened with high duties to the public, in fact enjoys high 
privileges at the expense of the public. 
The public deserves more from the legal profession than is 
being offered by the Respondent and the Amicus Curiae. This 
court should hold that the professional Corporation Act and the 
Utah State Constitution require that the trial court's decision 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this /*/ day of July, 1987. 
^ 5 ^ ^ ^ 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
stewapp.rpl 
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